Signalisation comportementale (document en anglais)

We outline a dividend signaling approach in which rational managers signal firm strength to

investors who are loss averse to reductions in dividends relative to the reference point set by

prior dividends. Managers with strong but unobservable cash earnings separate themselves by

paying high dividends but retain enough earnings to be likely not to fall short of the same level

next period. The model is consistent with several features of the data, including equilibrium

dividend policies similar to a Lintner partial-adjustment model; modal dividend changes of zero;

stronger market reactions to dividend cuts than increases; relative infrequency and irregularity of

repurchases versus dividends; and a core mechanism that does not center on public destruction of

value, a notion that managers reject in surveys. Supportive new tests involve nominal levels and

changes of dividends per share, announcement effects, and reference point currencies of ADR

dividends.Introduction

Managers share a number of common views about their dividend policies, as shown in

the survey by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005). They strive to avoid reducing

dividends per share (of the 384 managers surveyed, 93.8% agreed); they try to maintain a smooth

dividend stream (89.6%); and, they are reluctant to make changes that might have to be reversed

(77.9%). They follow such policies because they believe that there are negative consequences to

reducing dividends (88.1%), which they believe convey information to investors (80%). While

caution is merited in interpreting any survey responses, the Brav et al. results are further

consistent with Lintner’s (1956) own survey and interviews, his partial-adjustment model, and a

large empirical literature demonstrating a significant response to dividend announcements.

While managers appear to view dividends as some sort of signal to investors, they also

suggest that standard dividend signaling models are not focused on the correct mechanisms. For

example, the proposition that dividends are used to show that their firm can bear costs such as

borrowing external funds or passing up investment was summarily rejected (4.4% agreement, the

lowest in the entire survey). The idea of signaling through costly taxes did not receive much

more support (16.6%). Again, while we might not expect managers to admit public destruction

of value even in an anonymous survey, these findings suggest there is more to the story than the

economic

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