Signalisation comportementale (document en anglais)
Rapports de Stage : Signalisation comportementale (document en anglais). Recherche parmi 299 000+ dissertationsPar falouja0 • 10 Avril 2013 • 460 Mots (2 Pages) • 764 Vues
We outline a dividend signaling approach in which rational managers signal firm strength to
investors who are loss averse to reductions in dividends relative to the reference point set by
prior dividends. Managers with strong but unobservable cash earnings separate themselves by
paying high dividends but retain enough earnings to be likely not to fall short of the same level
next period. The model is consistent with several features of the data, including equilibrium
dividend policies similar to a Lintner partial-adjustment model; modal dividend changes of zero;
stronger market reactions to dividend cuts than increases; relative infrequency and irregularity of
repurchases versus dividends; and a core mechanism that does not center on public destruction of
value, a notion that managers reject in surveys. Supportive new tests involve nominal levels and
changes of dividends per share, announcement effects, and reference point currencies of ADR
dividends.Introduction
Managers share a number of common views about their dividend policies, as shown in
the survey by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005). They strive to avoid reducing
dividends per share (of the 384 managers surveyed, 93.8% agreed); they try to maintain a smooth
dividend stream (89.6%); and, they are reluctant to make changes that might have to be reversed
(77.9%). They follow such policies because they believe that there are negative consequences to
reducing dividends (88.1%), which they believe convey information to investors (80%). While
caution is merited in interpreting any survey responses, the Brav et al. results are further
consistent with Lintner’s (1956) own survey and interviews, his partial-adjustment model, and a
large empirical literature demonstrating a significant response to dividend announcements.
While managers appear to view dividends as some sort of signal to investors, they also
suggest that standard dividend signaling models are not focused on the correct mechanisms. For
example, the proposition that dividends are used to show that their firm can bear costs such as
borrowing external funds or passing up investment was summarily rejected (4.4% agreement, the
lowest in the entire survey). The idea of signaling through costly taxes did not receive much
more support (16.6%). Again, while we might not expect managers to admit public destruction
of value even in an anonymous survey, these findings suggest there is more to the story than the
economic
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